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3Block ciphers
 One of the fundamental cryptographic primitives is the 
block cipher.
 When used for encryption, a block cipher takes as input a 
block of n bits of plaintext P and outputs a block of n bits 
of ciphertext C.  [We call this an n-bit block cipher].
 Operation is controlled by a secret key K; we write 
C=eK(P) and P=dK(C) where d is the decryption function. 
 For each key, the encryption function implements a 
permutation on the set of all n-bit blocks.
4Examples of block ciphers
 Some well-known examples of block ciphers:
– DES: the Data Encryption Standard was first published in the 
US in the late 1970s, and rapidly became a de facto
international standard;
– DES suffers from a relatively short secret key (56 bits), and 
advances in technology have meant it is unacceptably weak.  
Triple DES (three iterations of DES using two or three DES 
keys) is a widely deployed fix to this problem.
– AES: the Advanced Encryption Standard, is a much more 
recent design with a 128-bit key, designed as a replacement 
for DES.
5Modes of operation
 Using a block cipher in the naïve way, i.e. dividing the 
data to be encrypted into blocks, and encrypting each 
block separately, is not a good idea.
 This is because if two blocks in the plaintext are the 
same (often likely) then the two ciphertext blocks will 
be the same.
 That is, the ciphertext will ‘leak’ information about the 
plaintext.
 Hence more complex ways of using a block cipher 
have been devised – called modes of operation. 
6What is CBC mode?
 CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode is a widely 
used technique for encrypting data using a 
block cipher (i.e. it is a mode of operation).
 It is purely a confidentiality technique – it does 
not provide any integrity protection for data.
 This is inevitable in that it does not add any 
redundancy – i.e. n bits of plaintext encrypt to n
bits of ciphertext, so all ciphertexts are ‘valid’.
7Confidentiality and integrity
 In many cases it is necessary to provide both 
confidentiality and integrity.
 With symmetric crypto, this is typically 
achieved by encrypting (e.g. using CBC mode) 
and computing a MAC (Message 
Authentication Code).
 Recent cryptanalytic results suggest that these 
need to be combined with care!
8Need for padding
 To use CBC mode, it is necessary for the data 
that is to be encrypted to be a multiple of n bits 
long (where n is the block cipher block length).
 This means that data often needs to be padded 
prior to encryption.
 Means must be provided for receiver of 
ciphertext to know which bits of final recovered 
plaintext are padding.
9Padding oracles
 Recipient of ciphertext must process final block to 
recover and remove padding.
 Depending on padding method, some recovered 
plaintexts may be ‘invalid’.
 In such a case the decrypter will typically generate an 
error message, e.g. to request a retransmission.
 This is an example of a padding oracle, i.e. an entity 
which will indicate whether or not a ciphertext yields 
valid padding when decrypted.
10
Padding oracle attacks
 Suppose a cryptanalyst can modify/insert 
messages into a communications channel.
 Then a padding oracle can be used to learn 
information about the plaintext by repeatedly 
sending modified versions of the ciphertext to 
the oracle and seeing what the result is.
 This has been shown to work against real 
implementations of well-known protocols.
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Solutions
 One solution is to try to limit the use of error 
messages – this is difficult to implement.
 Another widely advocated solution is to use 
only padding methods for which all possible 
deciphered messages are valid.
 Most satisfactory solution is to always use an 
integrity check, and to only decrypt a message 
if the integrity check passes.
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Need for encryption only
 Unfortunately, the final solution is not always 
practical.
 There are applications where encryption-only is 
required (these should be minimised).
 Examples include:
– encrypted voice (telephony) – typically 
retransmission is not an option because of latency;
– bulk data transfer (e.g. data trunks) – again 
retransmission not an option.
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Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode
 Plaintext must be a series of n-bit blocks:
P1, P2, ..., Pq.
 Then:             C1 = eK(P1 ⊕ IV)
Ci = eK(Pi ⊕ Ci-1)   (i>1)
(where ⊕ denotes bit-wise exclusive-or), and:
P1 = dK(C1) ⊕ IV
Pi = dK(Ci) ⊕ Ci-1 (i>1).
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CBC encryption
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CBC mode properties
 If same message encrypted twice using same 
IV, then the same ciphertext results.
 Two identical plaintext blocks produce different 
ciphertext blocks.
 Need for padding.
 Error propagation – one bit error in ciphertext 
means that one block of plaintext is lost, as 
well as one bit in the next block of plaintext.
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An observation
 Suppose P1, P2, …, Pq is a (padded) plaintext 
message which has been encrypted to C1, C2, 
…, Cq using key K and IV S.
 Suppose X1, X2, …, Xs-1, Cj, Xs+1, …, Xt is 
submitted for decryption, where s>1, j>1, and 
decrypted result is P′1, P′2, …, P′t.
 Then we have:
P′s ⊕ Pj = Xs-1 ⊕ Cj-1
19
This observation is key
 This simple observation is the basis of all 
padding oracle attacks.
 The observation can be use as the basis of two 
main types of attack designed to learn 
information about a plaintext message.
 We review these two attack approaches.
20
Attack type 1
 This attack is designed to learn information about a 
single ‘target’ plaintext block Pj.
 Using the previous notation the attacker sets:
Xs-1 = Cj-1 ⊕ Q
where Q is a chosen bit pattern.
 By our observation:  P′s ⊕ Pj = Q, i.e. the attacker can 
select the difference between P′s and the target plaintext Pj.
 If the attacker has some means of learning whether or 
not P′s generates a formatting error, then he may learn 
something about Pj.
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Attack type 2
 This attack involves learning information about an 
entire message.
 Suppose C1, C2, …, Cq and C*1, C*2, …, C*t are two 
ciphertext messages (which may be the same) 
encrypted using the same key.
 The cryptanalyst now submits the message:
C*1, C*2, …,C*s-1, Cj, C*s+1, …, C*t
 We also suppose that, in this case, the cryptanalyst 
can force the ‘oracle’ to decrypt this message using the 
same IV as was used to encrypt C*1, C*2, …, C*t.
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Attack type 2 (continued)
 Suppose decrypted result is P′1, P′2, …, P′t.
 Then:
– P′i = P*i for every i ≠ s or s+1;
– P′s ⊕ P*s = P*s ⊕ Pj ⊕ C*s-1 ⊕ Cj-1;
– P′s+1 ⊕ P*s+1 = C*s ⊕ Cj.
 If the attacker has some means of learning 
whether or not the plaintext generates an error, 
then this may reveal information about P*s ⊕ Pj(since everything else is known).
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Padding oracles reviewed
 In a padding oracle attack, an attacker has one 
or more valid ciphertexts, and can inject 
modified ciphertexts into the channel.
 The receiver will decrypt each ciphertext and 
generate an error message if the padding is 
incorrect.
25
Error oracles
 In an error oracle attack we suppose that, after 
decryption, the message is passed to a 
protocol implementation (e.g. an application) 
which will generate a detectable action (e.g. an 
error message) if the message format is 
incorrect.
 In this sense a padding oracle attack is just a 
special case of an error oracle attack.
26
Discussion
 Unlike padding oracles, it may not be possible to 
prevent error oracles.
 Applications are run across encrypted networks, where 
the application is not encryption-aware and the 
encryption layer is not application-aware.
 It is inevitable that some applications will react in 
unexpected ways to ill-formatted messages.
 Hence likelihood of error oracles should be minimised, 
e.g. by using authenticated encryption whenever 
possible.
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Assumptions
 Suppose a protocol, running at a higher layer 
in the protocol hierarchy than the encrypting 
protocol, provides error protection using a 16-
bit CRC.
 I.e. suppose plaintext P1, P2, …, Pq
corresponding to ciphertext C1, C2, …, Cq, 
incorporates a 16-bit CRC.
 Suppose attacker can also find out if error 
detection fails.
29
The error oracle query (attack type 2)
 The attacker replaces Cs with Cj for some s ≠ j.
 If the recovered ‘plaintext’ is P′1, P′2, …, P′t, then:
– P′i = Pi for every i ≠ s or s+1;
– P′s ⊕ Ps = Ps ⊕ Pj ⊕ Cs-1 ⊕ Cj-1;
– P′s+1 ⊕ Ps+1 = Cs ⊕ Cj.
 Given the original message contained a valid CRC, 
then the corrupted message will contain a valid CRC if 
and only if the exor of the original and corrupted 
messages contains a valid CRC (by linearity).
30
Results
 The exor of the original and corrupted 
plaintexts will be zero in all but two blocks, and 
the only unknown for these two blocks is the 
value of Ps ⊕ Pj.
 The probability the CRC will be correct is 2-16, 
but in that case the attacker will instantly know 
16 bits of information about the message.
 If an 8-bit CRC is used, then information can 
be obtained more rapidly.
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A message structure attack (type 1)
 Suppose the target plaintext message contains 
a fixed byte in a known position.
 Suppose the fixed byte is the kth byte of block 
Ps, for some s > 1.
 Many protocols contain fixed bytes (e.g. set to 
zero) for future-proofing – perhaps containing 
the version number of the protocol.
33
The error oracle query
 The attacker constructs 256 queries, one for 
each value of t (0 ≤ t ≤ 255).
 The attacker replaces Cs with Cj for some j ≠ s, 
and replaces Cs-1 with Cj-1 ⊕ Qt, where Qt has 
zeros everywhere except in the kth byte, which 
contains the binary representation of t.
 Precisely one of these (Qu say) will yield a 
plaintext with the correct value for the kth byte 
of the sth plaintext block.
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Results
 By the key observation, the recovered plaintext 
block P′s will equal:
Pj ⊕ Qu
 That is, for the value of t (i.e. u) that does not 
yield an error, the attacker knows that the kth
byte of Pj ⊕ Qu will equal the correct fixed byte.
 This immediately gives a byte of p/text block Pj.
 Repeat for every plaintext block (except P1).
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A content-based padding oracle attack
 We now describe a padding oracle attack 
which works against padding methods which 
are resistant to ‘normal’ padding oracle attacks.
 We need to suppose that the message sent is 
of fixed length, and that an error message will 
be generated if a message is received of the 
wrong length.
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Assumptions
 We suppose that the padding method in use 
involves adding a single one to the end of the 
data followed by the smallest number of zeros 
(at most n-1) necessary to create a whole 
number of n-bit blocks.
 This padding method is uniquely unpaddable, 
and resists known padding oracle attacks 
(almost every possible string of bits 
corresponds to a padded message).
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The error oracle query
 Suppose C1, C2, …, Cq is a valid ciphertext message 
for which the last d bits of Pq are 100…0  (the fixed 
message length is qn-d).
 The attacker makes 2d messages variants (0 ≤ t ≤ 2d-1) 
by modifying the last two blocks to:
Cj-1 ⊕ Qt, Cj
where Qt contains n-d zeros followed by the binary 
representation of t.
 One will not return a message length error – say Qu.
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Results
 By the key observation, the recovered plaintext 
block P′q will equal:
Pj ⊕ Qu
 That is, for the value of t (i.e. t=u) that does not 
yield an error, the attacker knows that the final 
d bits of Pj ⊕ Qu will equal 100…0.
 This immediately gives d bits of p/text block Pj.
 Repeat for every plaintext block (except P1).
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CBC mode and stream ciphers
 It would thus appear that CBC mode is 
dangerously prone to error oracle attacks, 
regardless of the padding method used.
 One other widely used method of encryption is 
the stream cipher.
 In a stream cipher, the data is encrypted by bit-
wise exoring it with a pseudorandom 
keystream sequence (generated as a function 
of a secret key).
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Stream ciphers and error oracles
 Stream ciphers do not suffer in the same way (they 
also do not require padding).
 There are examples of error oracle attacks on stream 
ciphers, but they seem harder to construct.
 Suppose two consecutive bits of a plaintext message 
are always equal to one of 00, 01, and 10 (and that 11 
will cause a detectable behaviour by the recipient).
 If the second of the two corresponding ciphertext bits is 
changed then error/no error means that the previous bit 
is 1/0.
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Use authenticated encryption
 The simplest and best solution to all these 
attacks is to use authenticated encryption (AE).
 This either means use the ‘encrypt-then-MAC’
paradigm, or use one of the AE block cipher 
modes recently developed (OCB versions 1 
and 2, EAX, CCM, …).
 Indeed, an international standard for AE 
schemes, ISO/IEC 19772, is being developed.
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Use a stream cipher
 If unauthenticated encryption is really 
necessary, then don’t use CBC mode!
 Probably the best choice is a stream cipher.
 This either means using a bespoke keystream 
generator (e.g. SNOW 2.0 or MUGI) or a block 
cipher in an appropriate mode, e.g. OFB or 
CTR mode.
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